Abstract-IEEE 802.11 is the standard designed to provide secured communication in wireless LAN. The IEEE 802.11i specification contains both WPA-PSK, WPA-GPG authentication protocols. IEEE 802.11w authentication protocol enhances the IEEE802.11i security for selected management frames. These protocols allow a wireless station to gain access to a protected wireless network managed by an access point. In this paper, a section of the protocols is chosen for modeling and verification. Communicating Sequential Process (CSP) is used for modeling and the verification is performed using CasperFDR. It can perform an exhaustive verification that can establish with mathematical certainty whether or not a given behavior is error-free and used to specify a system behavior in a formal validation model that defines interactions between the processes. We have analyzed and verified secrecy and authentication properties of the WPA-PSK, WPA-GPG and IEEE802.11w authentication protocols. This paper models both IEEE802.11i and IEEE802.11w authentication protocols by formal verification and analyzes the output. A few attacks are found in these protocols. The specifications through which these attacks were found are presented. The IEEE 802.11w authentication protocol is also modified in such a way that it is strong against to the attacks performed by intruder.
I. INTRODUCTION
Formal verification is the process of examining the protocol specifications for the presence of various errors that could lead to improper operation. Formal methods have been widely used to specify security protocols and verify security properties, such as confidentiality, authentication and non repudiation to guarantee correctness [1] [2] [3] . Formal verification is better than testing by implementation because it performs exhaustive testing before implementation and it is fully automated.
Failure Divergence Refinement (FDR) is one type of formal verification tool for state machine, with foundations in the theory of concurrency based on Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP). CSP was first described by Hoare in [4] [5] , and has been applied in many fields. FDR checks whether a security model described with CSP satisfies security properties such as secrecy and authentication. If the security model doesn't satisfy these properties, FDR shows counterexample and helps to identify which attack is possible. Over the last few years, a method for analyzing security protocol was established. It models using CSP, then verifies its secrecy, authentication and other properties using FDR [6] [7] . In this method, specifying the security protocol's behavior using CSP is most difficult task. Creating the description of the security model with CSP is a very error prone. To simplify the expression of the security protocol in CSP Gavin Lowe developed CasperFDR [8] .
CasperFDR is one of the prominent verifiers which can verify most of the communication protocols. It either performs random simulations of a protocol's execution or generates a CSP program that performs an efficient verification of the protocol's correctness properties. But the protocol has to be modeled in a high level language called SPL (protocol specification language). Using this language, a system behavior can be specified in a formal validation model that defines interactions of processes. CasperFDR can perform an exhaustive verification that can establish with mathematical certainty whether or not a given behavior is error-free. Especially, the use of CaperFDR approach has been very successful over the past few years and has discovered many attacks against protocols.
WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access) protocol is a subset of IEEE 802.11i standard. The IEEE 802.11i standard is designed to provide secured communication of wireless LAN as defined by all the IEEE 802.11 specifications. IEEE 802.11i enhances the WEP (Wire line Equivalent Privacy), a technology used for many years for the WLAN security, in the areas of encryption, authentication and key management. IEEE 802.11i is based on the Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA), which is a quick fix of the WEP weaknesses [9] .
The IEEE 802.11i standard provides secure communication between Authenticator and supplicant by using authentication, encryption and data integrity. The core is 802.1x (Port Access Control) and TKIP (Temporal Key Integrity Protocol). The IEEE 802.1X offers an effective framework for authenticating and controlling user traffic to a protected network, as well as dynamically varying encryption keys. 802.1X ties a protocol called EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol) to both the wired and wireless LAN media and supports multiple authentication methods, such as token cards, Kerberos, one-time passwords, certificates, and public key authentication. WPA protocol is a subset of IEEE 802.11i standard.
The IEEE 802.11i enhances the security of IEEE 802.11 at MAC layer by using two protocols, WPA-PSK and WPA-GPG for authentication of wireless station to access point. In IEEE 802.11i the system management information is represented in unencrypted management frames, which makes them vulnerable.
WPA-GPG is a modification on WPA-PSK authentication protocol that allows a wireless station (also known as supplicant or STA) to gain access to a protected wireless network, managed by an Access Point (also known as AP or authenticator), by means of its personal GPG key [10] . WPA-GPG verifies that the authenticating STA is the owner of the key that it is providing to the AP, this represents the core of the authentication process. WPA-GPG does not require specific hardware nor firmware since, its modifications to the original protocol are important but not radical. WPA-GPG ensures the same level of security of WPA-PSK but it also guarantees in-network user privacy and non-repudiation of network traffic. With the term in-network user privacy we mean that network traffic is encrypted in a way that even STAs which have the right to authenticate are not able to decrypt it. As a direct consequence WPA-GPG also allows the AP to know exactly which STA has generated what traffic, ensuring non-repudiation.
The IEEE 802.11w enhances the security of IEEE 802.11i by providing data confidentiality to management frames which provides data integrity, data origin authentication and replay protection.
For verification of security protocols in wireless networks, it is important to identify the capabilities of an adversary. There are three types of frames in WLAN they are Management Frames, Control Frames, and Data Frames. Any modification to these frames directly impacts data confidentiality, integrity, mutual authentication, and availability. It will be considered a threat.
The following attacks are possible in wireless networks.
Passive Eavesdropping and Traffic Analysis
Owing to the limitations of wireless networks, an adversary can easily store and analyze the traffic in a WLAN. Even though the messages are encrypted there is a possibility to learn partial or complete information from encrypted messages by an adversary. This possibility exists if common message fields are predictable or redundant.
Message Injection and Active Eavesdropping
An adversary is capable of inserting a message into the wireless network using devices with a common wireless Network Interface Card (NIC) by using some software and also able to control any field of a packet using techniques [11] . Therefore an adversary can generate any packet, modify contents of a packet, and completely control the transmission of the packet. The adversary can also break the data integrity algorithm and can also insert a replayed packet. The adversary might be able to learn more information from the reaction of the system through active eavesdropping by inserting some packets.
Message Deletion and Interception
The adversary is capable of removing a packet from the network before the packet reaches its destination and also controls connection completely. In other words, the adversary can capture a packet before the receiver actually receives it, and decide whether to delete the packet or forward it to the receiver. This is more dangerous than the eavesdropping and message deletion. Interception differs from eavesdropping and replaying, because the receiver does not get the packet before the adversary forwards it.
Masquerading and Malicious AP
MAC address is included in all the packets transmitted in a wireless network as plaintext. Hence, an adversary can learn this information by just eavesdropping. The adversary is also capable of modifying its MAC address to any value. If a system uses MAC address as the only identification of the wireless devices, the adversary can masquerade as any wireless station by spoofing its MAC address or it can masquerade as an Access Point (AP) by spoofing its MAC address. An adversary is also able to install his own AP, with a forged MAC address and a spoofed SSID.
Session Hijacking
The adversary may be able to hijack a legitimate session after the wireless devices have completed authentication successfully. First, the adversary disconnects a device from an existing session, and then masquerades as this device to obtain possible connections without the attention of the other devices. In this type of attack, the adversary is able to receive all packets routed to the hijacked device and also sends packets to other devices on behalf of the hijacked device.
Man-in-the-Middle
In this attack, first the adversary breaks the connection between a wireless station and AP and masquerades as legitimate station to associate with AP. If AP adopts any mechanism to authenticate the station, the adversary must be able to spoof the authentication and masquerade as AP to fool the station.
Denial of Service
In wireless networks, an adversary may launch DOS attacks in several ways. For example, forging the unprotected management frames or using some protocol weaknesses, or jamming of the frequency band will deny service to legitimate users.
First, we formally model and analyze the IEEE 802.11i WPA-PSK, WPA-GPG and IEEE 802.11w protocols. Next, we show that there are no other known attacks on IEEE 802.11i WPA-PSK, WPA-GPG and IEEE 802.11w protocols.
The main aim of this paper is to model and verify some of the important portions of IEEE 802.11i WPA-PSK, WPA-GPG and IEEE802.11w authentication protocols.
II. RELATED WORK
Johnson and Walker are among the first researchers who discussed the security issues in IEEE 802.16 [12] . They propose to enhance PKMv1 protocols with mutual authentication to enable the SS to authenticate the BS as well as the BS authenticating the SS, and with the addition of nonce's to counter replay attacks.
Xu, Huang, Matthews [13] , have analyzed security issues on the PKMv1, PKMv2 protocols using Casper FDR and proposed solutions.
Raju, Valli Kumari, Varma and Raju performed formal verification of IEEE 802.16m PKMv3 protocol using CasperFDR [14] and identified some of the attacks that are possible in that protocol. IEEE 802.16m is the standard representing the security architecture for multi hop relay of broadband wireless access.
Kim, Kim, Lee and Choi also applied formal verification technique to ASK mobile security protocol using CasperFDR [15] and identified the possibility of replay attack. The functionality of this protocol is to provide authentication and key agreement in low-power portable devices such as mobile phones.
Islam, Sqvalli and Khan also performed Formal verification of Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) [16] and identified the problem of assigning the same IP addresses to different hosts. DHCP is a widely used communication protocol.
Wi-Fi Protected access (WPA) is enabled using MAC filtering and it is less secure [17] . According to survey there is no clear insight into this protocol by the research community. But much work has been done on other wireless protocols like PKMV1, PKMV2 that belong to 802.16 standards [18] .
Raju, Valli Kumari and Raju performed formal verification of WPA-PSK authentication protocol in IEEE 802.11i using CasperFDR [19] and identified some of the attacks that are possible in that protocol.
Raju and Valli Kumari further performed formal verification of WPA-GPG authentication protocol in IEEE 802.11i using CasperFDR [20] and listed some of the attacks that are possible in that protocol.
III. PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION LANGUAGE
We have taken Needham-Schroeder Public Key protocol as an example for this section and discussed the protocol in the following sub sections. We also need some way of representing starting point of the protocol. We assume that the run is initiated by A receiving some message from a user, or the environment, including B's identity. We represent this by an extra message in the protocol description. In above example the variables na and nb should be taken to be of type Nonce. The functions PK and SK return an agent's public key and secret key, respectively.
InverseKeys = (PK, SK)
The above line means that the functions PK and SK, when applied to the same identity, return keys that are inverses of each other.
C. Processes
Each agent running in the system will be represented by a CSP process under processes section. For NeedhamSchroeder authentication protocol the processes section is defined below.
#Processes INITIATOR(A,na) knows PK, SK(A) RESPONDER(B,nb) knows PK, SK(B)
These lines give names to the roles played by the different agents (here INITIATOR and RESPONDER).The parameters and the variables following the keyword "knows" define the knowledge that the agent in question is expected to have at the beginning of the protocol run.
D. Specifications
The requirements of the protocol are specified under #Specification section For Needham-Schroeder authentication protocol the specification section is defined as below. In above example the lines starting with Secret specify that certain data items should be secret. The first secret specification Secret(A,na,[B]) specifies that A thinks that na is a secret that can be known to only himself and B.
The lines starting with Agreement are authentication specifications. The first authentication specification Agreement(A,B,[na,nb]) specifies that A is correctly authenticated to B, and the two agents agree on the data values na and nb.
E. The system definition
The system definition contains following sub sections.
Type definitions
The types of variables to be used in the actual system to be checked are defined in a similar way to the types of the free variables under Actual variables section. For Needham-Schroeder authentication protocol the Actual variables section is defined as below.
#Actual variables Alice, Bob, Mallory : Agent Na, Nb, Nm : Nonce According to above example the system dealing with three agents (Mallory will be the intruder), and three nonce's. The public and secret keys of these agents are defined in the #Functions section, below.
Functions
The functions that are used by the agents in the protocol description have to be defined under the #Functions section. For Needham-Schroeder authentication protocol the Functions section is defined as below.
#Functions Symbolic PK, SK
The above lines represent that the functions PK (which returns an agent's public key) and SK (which returns an agent's secret key) to be symbolic: this means that Casper produces its own values to represent the results of function applications.
System definition
The system definition section represents which agents should be present in the system to be checked. For Needham-Schroeder authentication protocol the System section is defined as below. #System INITIATOR(Alice, Na) RESPONDER(Bob, Nb)
From the above lines we consider a system with a single initiator, Alice (taking the role of A in the protocol description), and a single responder, Bob, they use nonce's Na and Nb. The types of the parameters of the processes should match the types of the parameters of the corresponding processes defined under the #Processes section.
The intruder
Finally, the intruder section defines the operation of the intruder is specified by giving his identity, and the set of data values that he knows initially. For NeedhamSchroeder authentication protocol the Intruder Information section is defined as below.
#Intruder Information Intruder = Mallory IntruderKnowledge = {Alice, Bob, Mallory, Nm, PK, SK(Mallory)} In the above example the intruder's identity to be Mallory and initially knows all the agents' identities, a single nonce Nm, the public key function PK, and his own secret key SK.
IV. THE PROPOSED MODEL
In this section the IEEE802.11i WPA-PSK, WPA-GPG and IEEE802.11w authentication protocols message formats and the details of the proposed models are described.
A. WPA-PSK Authentication Protocol Structure
WPA-PSK authentication protocol uses EAPOL messages, whose format is defined within the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), but it reduces to a fourway handshake aiming to verify that STA knows the secret Pre-Shared Key, also known as Pair wise Master Key (PMK), and to establish a Pair wise Transient Key (PTK) which is installed into the MAC layer. A PTK is generated in order to reduce as much as possible the use of PMK and, as a consequence, its exposition to attacks. Besides PTK a Group Transient Key (GTK) is generated to allow the transmission of multicast and broadcast traffic within the wireless network.
The PSK is 256 bit long and can be set through a passphrase, namely an alphanumeric sequence which is then hashed to obtain the PSK, or directly as 64 characters long hexadecimal string. After a successful 4-Way Handshake, a secure communication channel between the authenticator and the supplicant can be constructed for subsequent data transmissions, based on the shared PTK and/or GTK. The 4-Way Handshake may be repeated using the same PMK. The PTK is derived from a hashing function applied to a combination of the PMK, the STA(supplicant) and AP(authenticator) MAC addresses and two 32 byte long random numbers generated by STA and AP called Snonce and ANonce respectively. The first message is sent by the AP and contains the AP random nonce (ANonce). This message is not encrypted and no MIC is attached (the PTK cannot be derived yet).
The second message is sent by the STA to AP it contains STA random nonce (SNonce) and knows all the information required to derive PTK from PMK. In WPA-PSK the correctness of IE is checked through MIC verification.
After receiving second message AP is able to derive PTK, check MIC correctness and continue the authentication by attaching GTK in message 3. The fourth message is a sort of acknowledgment sent by STA to AP, it contains nothing but a MIC.
B. Modeling WPA-PSK Authentication Protocol
The modeled WPA-PSK authentication protocol is shown below. In the specification the initiator A and responder S represents Authenticator and Supplicant. 
C. WPA-GPG Authentication Protocol Structure
The goal of WPA-PSK four-way handshake protocol is to create a PTK known both to supplicant and authenticator while not revealing the PMK. WPA-GPG has exactly the same goal, with the difference that no PSK is shared between STA and AP but STA uses its GPG key to authenticate. In WPA-GPG the PMK is randomly generated by the AP, encrypted and sent to the authenticating STA. Both AP and STA will therefore be able to derive a PTK from the PMK, exactly as it happens with WPA-PSK, with the main difference that each PTK cannot be derived by other STAs. The first message is sent by the AP and contains the AP random nonce (ANonce). This message is not encrypted and no MIC is attached (the PTK cannot be derived yet).
After receiving the first message, the STA will send its nonce (SNonce) and attaches the STA public key (GPG Key) for authentication, and attaches the signature of ANonce and received RSN IE(Information elements) .The signed RSN IE is added to allow AP to verify that the STA has received a correct element and to prevent version rollback attack. After receiving the second message, the AP will verify the validity of STA signature on ANonce, using the key attached to message 2. The AP will generate a random 32 byte PMK which is kept secret and derives the PTK. Attaches IE and GTK to the message and computes message MIC. Encrypt the generated PMK using STA public key. After receiving the third message, the STA will decrypt the PMK with its public key and derives the PTK and verifies the MIC value of message 3. If MIC code verification is successful STA can send the acknowledgment which contains nothing but a MIC and AP can authorize it to access the network.
D. Modeling WPA-GPG Authentication Protocol
The modeled WPA-GPG authentication protocol is shown below. In the specification the initiator A and responder S represents Authenticator and Supplicant. 
E. IEEE 802.11w Authentication Protocol Structure
The goal of IEEE 802.11w is to enhance the IEEE802.11 MAC layer security for selected management frames. IEEE 802.11w authentication protocol uses EAPOL messages, whose format is defined within the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), but it reduces to a four-way handshake aiming to verify that STA knows the secret Pre-Shared Key, also known as Pair wise Master Key (PMK), and to establish a Pair wise Transient Key (PTK) which is installed into the MAC layer. A PTK is generated in order to reduce as much as possible the use of PMK and, as a consequence, its exposition to attacks. Besides PTK a Group Transient Key (GTK) is generated to allow the transmission of multicast and broadcast traffic within the wireless network and integrity GTK (IGTK) is generated to allow the management frames protection. The first message is sent by the AP and contains the AP random nonce (ANonce). This message is not encrypted and no MIC is attached (the PTK cannot be derived yet).
The second message is sent by the STA to AP it contains STA random nonce (SNonce) and knows all the information required to derive PTK from PMK. In WPA-PSK the correctness of IE is checked through MIC verification. After receiving second message AP is able to derive PTK, check MIC correctness and continue the authentication by attaching GTK and IGTK in message 3.The fourth message is a sort of acknowledgment sent by STA to AP, it contains nothing but a MIC.
IntruderKnowledge={Authenticator, Supplicant, Mallory, Nm, pk, sk(Mallory)}
V. VERIFICATION AND ANALAYSIS OF PROTOCOLS
In this section the IEEE802.11i WPA-PSK, WPA-GPG and IEEE802.11w authentication protocols verification and results are discussed.
A. Analysis of WAP-PSK Authentication Protocol
After compiling and checking, the above model in CasperFDR, attacks were found for two of the four properties declared in specification part. Out of four property1 and property2 are related to secret specifications next property3 and property4 are related to authentication specifications. No attacks were found for secret specifications but CasperFDR found two attacks on authentication specifications in the specification part. The top level trace Generated by CasperFDR is Supplicant believes that it has completed a run of the protocol, taking role RESPONDER, with Authenticator, using data items Na, Ns. Authenticator also believes that it is running the protocol.
An attack on the property3 Agreement(A, S, [na,ns]) can be explained in the following steps. • Initially the intruder directly receives information about Na value when the Authenticator sends Na value to Supplicant as shown in the above messages 0 and first instance of message 1.
• During the second instance of message 1 the intruder acts as Authenticator and sends Na value to Supplicant.
• The intruder also acts as Authenticator (I_Authenticator) and receives information from Supplicant.
• Now the intruder acts as a legitimate Supplicant and Authenticator during the 3 rd
• However the communication between Supplicant and Authenticator is also captured by the intruder by using man-in-the-middle attack.
message instances.
• After receiving the entire information the intruder will be in a position such that it can derive GTK. The attack on the property4 Agreement(S, A, [na,ns]) can be explained in the following steps. ) and receives information about Na value when the Authenticator sends Na value to Supplicant as shown in the above messages 0 and first instance of message 1.
• During the second instance of message 1 the intruder directly sends Na value to Supplicant.
• The intruder also receives Ns value form Supplicant and acts as Supplicant(I_Supplicant) and send the same information to Authenticator.
• Now the intruder acts as a legitimate Supplicant and receives information about PMK during the 3 rd
• After receiving the entire information the intruder will be in a position such that it can derive GTK. After performing these operations not only the Authenticator and the Supplicant but the Intruder can also derive GTK key from PMK that is the key used between Authenticator and Supplicant for message encryption.
B. Analysis of WAP-GPG Authentication Protocol
After compiling and checking the above model in CasperFDR, attacks were found for two of the four properties declared in specification part. Out of four property1 and property2 are related to secret specifications next property3 and property4 are related to authentication specifications. CasperFDR found attacks on every specification in the specification part. An attack on the property1 Secret(A, na, [S]) as shown below. It represents the Supplicant believes Ns is secret but the intruder also knows Ns value. From the above attacks we found that not only the Authenticator and the Supplicant but the Intruder can also derive GTK key from PMK that is the key used between Authenticator and Supplicant for message encryption.
C. Analysis of IEEE 802.11w Authentication Protocol
After compiling and checking, the above model in CasperFDR attacks were found for two of the four properties declared in specification part. Out of four property1 and property2 are related to secret specifications next property3 and property4 are related to authentication specifications. No attacks were found for secret specifications but CasperFDR found two attacks on authentication specifications in the specification part. The top level trace Generated by CasperFDR is Supplicant believes that it has completed a run of the protocol, taking role RESPONDER, with Authenticator, using data items Na, Ns. Authenticator also believes that it is running the protocol.
An attack on the property3 Agreement(A, S, [na,ns]) can be explained in the following steps. 0.Authenticator:Mallory 1.AuthenticatorI_Mallory:{Na}{pk(Mallory)} 1.I_AuthenticatorSupplicant:{Na}{pk(Supplicant)} 2.SupplicantI_Authenticator:{Ns}{pk(Authenticator)}, f(Na) 2.I_MalloryAuthenticator:{Ns}{pk(Authenticator)}, f(Na) 3.AuthenticatorI_Mallory:{Kgt,Kigt}{Kpt}, f(Ns) 3.I_AuthenticatorSupplicant:Kgt,Kigt}{Kpt}, f(Ns) 4.SupplicantI_Authenticator:f(Kgt,Kigt) Done
• Initially the intruder directly receives information about Na value when the Authenticator sends Na value to Supplicant as shown in the above messages 0 and first instance of message 1.
• After receiving the entire information the intruder will be in a position such that it can derive GTK and IGTK. The attack on the property4 Agreement(S, A, [na,ns]) can be explained in the following steps. 0.Authenticator:Supplicant 1.AuthenticatorI_Supplicant:{Na}{pk(Supplicant)} 1.I_MallorySupplicant:{Na}{pk(Supplicant)} 2.SupplicantI_Mallory:{Ns}{pk(Mallory)}, f(Na) 2.I_SupplicantAuthenticator:{Ns}{pk(Authenticator)}, f(Na) 3.Authenticator I_Supplicant:{Kgt,Kigt}{Kpt}, f(Ns) 3.I_MallorySupplicant:{Kgt,Kigt}{Kpt}, f(Ns) 4.SupplicantI_Mallory:f(Kgt,Kigt) 4.I_SupplicantAuthenticator:f(Kgt,Kigt) Done
• Initially the intruder acts as Supplicant (I_Supplicant) and receives information about Na value when the Authenticator sends Na value to Supplicant as shown
